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Abstract. Land value appreciation in the urbanization process has triggered market speculation. The Land Bank System 
strengthens local governments’ ability to control land supply and distribution rights. Local governments are considered 
close stakeholders. Under the pressure of guaranteeing economic growth and promotion, local governments have increased 
their dependence on land finances. It is important for investors to understand the local governments’ behaviors, and draw 
up business strategies. This study aims to examine the influencing factors and formation mechanism of local government 
land hoarding. The research hypothesis was tested by collating provincial-level panel data of China from 2004 to 2015 and 
using dynamic panel data estimated by the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). A significant positive correlation 
was found between residential land price and  land hoarding area by local governments. Land speculation in the eastern 
region is also more pronounced than that in central and western regions. In addition, empirical studies have found a cor-
relation between the degree of government intervention and local government land hoarding behavior. The higher the 
degree of government intervention, the less land sold through bid invitation, auction, and listing, which are linked to the 
corresponding hoarding land area.
Keywords: local government, land hoarding, land price, GMM, China.
Introduction
Investment and speculation are different types of business 
behavior. Speculation is a short-run phenomenon, referring 
to a business behavior that pursues short-term economic 
benefits. Speculators tend to buy assets with the expectation 
that a profit can be earned from subsequent price volatility. 
Investment involves putting money into an asset which is 
not necessarily marketable in the short run. So, investment 
involves long-term expectations about certain assets. The 
distinction between investment and speculation is the role 
of expectations. Speculation involves a high level of risk and 
uncertain expectation of returns. In China’s land system, lo-
cal governments are monopolists who actually pursue land 
revenue maximization. So, the local governments are taken 
as land sellers capturing short-term profit on land market. 
It is important for investors, understanding the behaviors of 
China’s local governments on the land market, to draw up 
their business strategies and inform their own competitive 
positions within the real estate industry (Liu et al., 2018a; 
Remeikienė et al., 2019).
Land speculation is an economic phenomenon in ur-
banization and a strategic advance used by speculators 
hoarding lands for future high returns. Along with the 
prosperity, recession, and depression in the economic cy-
cle, widespread speculations have been reported, such as in 
Chicago in 1830–1933, Philadelphia in 1945–1962, Seat-
tle in 1956–1966, England in 1960–1970, Jordan in 1975–
1983, and Hainan in 1990–1993 (Quaife & Hoyt, 1934; 
Tewfik, 1989). Studies have shown that land speculation 
is an important factor in the formation of real estate price 
volatility and asset bubbles (Goodman & Thibodeau, 2008; 
Hui et al., 2017). Moreover, land speculation is always ac-
companied by land hoarding, which directly affects the 
timing, use, and scale of market supply. Areas undergoing 
rapid urbanization can often perceive contradictions. On 
the one hand, land prices continue to rise and demand is 
strong. On the other hand, hoarding causes land vacant 
and idle. As a result, long-term development has not led to 
effective land use within such areas. Neutze (1968, 1970) 
argued that the key strategies in land speculation are to 
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hoard undeveloped, potential, and readily tradable land 
and wait for the opportunity to obtain high profits. Land 
speculation is objectively helpful in supporting urban de-
velopments and maintaining economic vibrancy, such as 
in Seattle and Indonesia (Rancich, 1970). Land represents 
all aspects of developed properties (e.g., location, ameni-
ties, and option value), making market value higher than 
cost (Davis, 2009). Other things being equal, a large share 
of land area evidently accounts for real estate price fluc-
tuations (Nichols et  al., 2013). Furthermore, when land 
speculation becomes extreme to generate price bubbles, 
the social and economic systems may be harmed. Such 
as the Great Depression of the United States in the 1930s 
originated from land speculation; the collapse of land 
price bubbles also brought Japan into the “lost decade” 
(Okumura, 1997). The 2008 financial crisis in the Unit-
ed States was also accompanied by a burst of real estate 
price bubbles, a sharp drop in land prices, and a decline 
in investments, which had a serious impact on the global 
economy (Liu et al., 2018b).
In the context of globalization, urban development has 
been an important driver of economic growth over the past 
decades. Urban growth controls can preserve open space 
and other amenities but may come at the expense of high 
land and housing prices (Mercy, 2011). China’s economic 
integration into globalization has resulted in the gradual 
transformation of land resources from planned distribu-
tion to market al.ocation. Large-scale land development 
has been implemented nationwide, and the country has 
entered the booming cycle of the real estate market and 
fast lane of urbanization (Ho & Lin, 2003). Since China’s 
Reform and Opening, urbanization has been characterized 
by an unprecedented amount of land development result-
ing from land marketization and commodification (Huang 
& Chan, 2018). In order to improve land use efficiency, 
the Chinese government separated land use rights from 
land ownership in the 1980s (Lin & Ho, 2005). Since the 
reform and opening up of special economic zones in 1979, 
foreign-funded and private enterprises have required legal 
and clear and legal property rights. In 1988, the constitu-
tional amendment adopted “allowing land use rights to 
be transferred in accordance with the law,” through which 
private enterprises can obtain land use rights. In 2002, the 
Ministry of Land and Resources promulgated the Regula-
tions on the Transfer of State-owned Land Use Rights by 
Bidding, Auction, and Listing. Urban land use rights must 
be transferred by means of bidding, auction, or listing. The 
marketization level has further improved, while allocation 
and agreement methods have been retained.
The land use system reform clarifies that residential 
development requires urban state-owned land, which can 
only be obtained from the government through bidding, 
auction, and listing. Local governments monopolize ur-
ban land supply, which is handled by real estate develop-
ment. During marketization and urbanization, the role 
of government is affected by economic interests. Local 
governments are the regulators of land resource use and 
suppliers of land markets. Institutional arrangements of 
referees and athletes are regarded as one, thus making 
the reconciliation of roles and functions difficult. The 
restriction of urban land supply has various effects on 
real estate destocking over different time periods and 
under the influence of the development status of differ-
ent cities (Shen et al., 2018). Given the rising land prices 
during 2004–2015, local government land hoarding and 
land income were remarkable. Both are important factors 
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Figure 1. China’s average land price, land income, and land hoarding from 2006 to 2015
Note: Data sources: China Statistical Yearbook of Land and Resources (2007–2016), all the data is got from open resources, 
and the copyright is permitted legally.
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In the current Chinese land system, there are two 
types of land ownership, state-ownership and collective-
ownership. Industrial land use rights can be transferred 
to different land lease terms (Ye et al., 2018). A long-term 
equilibrium exists between urban housing and land mar-
ket in China. These policies may have adverse side effects 
(Koster et al., 2012). Land use regulations may also reduce 
property value (Grout et al., 2011). Since 2004, the new 
land grant institution in China has resulted in low effi-
ciency due to the housing and land market information 
asymmetry imbalance (Du et al., 2010).
In relation to other private land speculations and land 
hoarding behaviors, this study focus on local govern-
ments, influencing factors, and formation mechanisms. 
On the basis of the three dimensions, the following ques-
tions have been addressed. (1) Does market price affect 
local government land hoarding scale in Chinese land sys-
tem? (2) Does the degree of land marketization and gov-
ernment intervention affect land hoarding scale? (3) Does 
local governments’ land financial dependence affect land 
hoarding scale? The paper is organized in the following 
manner. The first part presents the literature review. The 
second part discusses the research hypotheses and empiri-
cal model. The third part explains the research area and 
variable description. The fourth part is the empirical result 
and the final part provides the conclusion.
1. Literature review
1.1. Land speculation and hoarding behavior
Land scarcity and regulation lead to the short-term lack of 
elasticity in supply. As a result, land is high quality specu-
lative goods. Land speculation occurs when investors’ ex-
pecting return is higher than the land holding cost. Land 
price and fluctuation are the important influencing factors 
of land hoarding. Land speculative income mainly comes 
from the difference between land prices and rent fluctua-
tion, whereas cost includes opportunity cost, land hold-
ing interest, and related taxes and fees (Bentick, 2010a). 
If land hoarding cost is relatively stable and land prices 
are expected to rise, then the market hoarding behavior 
becomes active. On the one hand, rapid urbanization pro-
motes large-scale land development. When rising expecta-
tions are formed, they attract additional capital to perform 
land hoarding (Lavin & Zorn, 2001). On the other hand, 
adequate capital and a relaxed financing environment 
in society are also factors in promoting land hoarding, 
and capital must find suitable investment opportunities 
(Schmid, 1968). Margin profit can further squeeze the 
investment opportunities of the real economy, and specu-
lators thus tend to hoard more land. As far as specula-
tors are concerned, they can be divided into individuals, 
developers and governments. With the establishment of 
the urban land reserve system and approach of the land 
development supervision system, developers’ land specu-
lation has nearly been regulated.
Uncertainty and price volatility in the land market are 
necessary conditions for land speculation. New economies, 
booming real estate markets, and rising housing prices in-
crease the demand for residential property, which helps 
investors maximize land gains. Fluctuations in real estate 
prices are often considered good speculative opportuni-
ties. The best option for landholders is to keep land vacant 
so that it can be traded for profit. When the land enters 
the development and construction stage, land transaction 
becomes complicated and difficult. Thus, obtaining vacant 
property rights and easy-to-trade land is an important 
condition (Bentick, 2010b). Holding vacant land inevita-
bly results in a certain cost for holders. Hoarding cost is 
an important factor affecting holding scale. It can also be 
summarized as the opportunity cost, interest, and tax cost 
of land (Bourassa et al., 2010). When the speculator is the 
government, hoarding cost only includes opportunity and 
interest costs and the government does not need to pay 
corresponding taxes. Property tax is considered a regulator 
between land income and holding cost. The imperfection 
and lack of property tax system is considered an important 
reason for land speculation. Farmland protection policy is 
also a factor in promoting land price increases, such as in 
China and Japan (Lichtenberg & Ding, 2008). In response 
to housing speculations, the Netherlands proposed a solu-
tion from the municipal land supply system and new hous-
ing policy (Golland & Boelhouwer, 2002). Some studies 
have discussed the effect of property taxes on land and 
housing speculation. The literatures assess the differential 
effects of increasing land value and taxation by comparing 
urban and undeveloped land, buildings, and vacant land 
and rent and sale prices. The results of the study show 
that tax is ultimately borne by consumers. For the boom-
ing land market, observing the tax design of land prices is 
necessary to further stimulate land speculation.
Hui (2004) focused on the impact of demand on land, 
but rarely considered the impact of land supply. Further-
more, land market has a dual nature, which means that 
the government owns most land that can be developed but 
are mainly completed by real estate developers (Ooi et al., 
2011). Researches on land speculation and hoarding focus 
on private and corporate investment behaviors. However, 
government land speculation is still lacking. Du and Pei-
ser (2014) investigated the land hoarding issue involving 
the Chinese local governments by using provincial-level 
data from 1995 to 2010 to assess the relationship between 
land prices and land scale held by local governments. They 
found that the local governments’ land hoarding scale is 
closely related to the land market condition. For every 
one-yuan increase in land prices, the local governments’ 
land hoarding increases by 40.8 hectares. In countries 
with institutional transition, government’s deep involve-
ment in economic development is an important feature. 
The rational motives of the local governments’ land hoard-
ing expect the price fluctuation of the land market and 
decide the opportunity to sell to increase land transfer 
income. Before entering the land hoarding pool, the local 
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governments must pay the development cost. Agricultural 
land use for non-agricultural construction must be req-
uisitioned firstly. Farmers involved are compensated ac-
cording to the corresponding administrative standard rate, 
and the government receives the full land appreciation 
value (Du & Peiser, 2014). Local governments can obtain 
favorable commercial loans to support their land hoard-
ing. If land prices remain stable and keep rising, then the 
revenue of local governments’ land hoarding remains sta-
ble (Su et al., 2012). Conversely, if the real estate market 
(which is correlated with the land market) fluctuates, then 
the expected change can greatly influence land revenue 
and hoarding scale.
1.2. Land marketization and land finance
Land supply is the basic material constraint of urban 
sprawl. Therefore, land market plays a critical role in 
urban development (Zhang et  al., 2017). State-owned 
construction land is the only legal land source for urban 
development in China, and its supply influences urban 
expansion, house prices, and economic development (Ji-
ang et al., 2016). The basic logic of China’s land system 
reform is to promote land as a stimulating lever for eco-
nomic development. On the one hand, local governments 
can make lucrative land revenues as urban infrastructure 
financing. They can also use low price land as an impor-
tant bargaining chip for investment promotion. Under 
the land market al.ocation mode, local governments sell 
land through public bidding, auction, and listing, which 
are considered market-oriented methods. Therefore, the 
proportion of bidding and auction in land transfer is re-
garded as the degree of land marketization. A competi-
tive land market can generate high land prices and land 
revenue. In 2002, the Ministry of Land and Resources 
adopted this approach and required land for develop-
ment (including commercial, tourism, entertainment, 
residential use) to be sold through tendering, bidding, 
and listing. As manufacturing and industrial production 
shift to areas with low land costs, local governments face 
fierce competition to attract and hold this type of invest-
ment. “Bottom line competition” is a common strategy 
for local governments to attract industrial investment 
with low-price industrial land.
It is believed that local governments’ land hoarding 
is also related to central and local fiscal system arrange-
ments. In 1994, the central and local governments imple-
mented a tax-sharing system. Land grant premiums and 
land tax revenues have become two major sources of fis-
cal revenues for local governments in China (Wu et  al., 
2015a). Budget deficit is a common fiscal pressure that 
Chinese cities deal with (Wu et al., 2015b). Local govern-
ments must look for new sources of funds outside the tax-
ation to complete the huge economic development plan. 
An important indicator of land market reform is that the 
land reserve system, bidding and auctioning methods are 
established in the form of laws and regulations. Land has 
become an important source of income for local govern-
ments and is a high-quality financing collateral (Wang 
et al., 2012). The local governments monopolize the sup-
ply of land through bidding, auction, and land transfer 
complicates the urban land price formation mechanism 
of China (Wen et al., 2018). The huge land revenue is dis-
tributed between the central and local governments, and 
more than 90% of the proceeds are used by local govern-
ments. The tax-sharing reform is an adjustment to the 
distribution of fiscal revenues between the central and 
local governments. The policies also strengthen the cen-
tral government’s intervention in the degree of freedom of 
local fiscal control. In a certain sense, tax-sharing reform 
strengthens the marginal tendency of local governments 
to directly obtain the current fiscal revenue through land 
transfer fees. Therefore, local governments are bound to 
depend on land finance. As local governments experience 
financial pressures, the sharp rise in land sales supports 
the assumptions of local officials using land finance to 
stimulate economic development (Dong, 2016). Although 
certain risks are involved in these behaviors, the benefits 
of increased local fiscal revenues to local finances are 
significant. As a result, local governments tend to hoard, 
which is also affected by other factors. As the market envi-
ronment is still not perfect, governments act as mediators 
in the land market. Local governments have limited land 
resources, and developers’ optimistic expectations for fu-
ture land appreciation have intensified the overheating of 
land market investment.
The tax-sharing system forms a single-share tax and a 
shared tax between the central and local governments. Af-
ter implementing the tax-sharing fiscal reform, the central 
government’s financial situation significantly improved, 
and the surplus increased. However, the local governments’ 
debt continued to rise. Land income has become the main 
source of local governments’ revenue. Only 10% of the 
total government investment in infrastructure comes from 
the local tax and fee. The remaining 90% is provided by 
land sales income or land mortgage loans. In this context, 
local governments must find appropriate sources to sup-
port the infrastructure for rapid urbanization. To make up 
for the serious fiscal deficit, urban construction land is an 
important asset of local governments, and the high land 
price is a prerequisite for maintaining land revenue. In 
2007, the establishment of the urban land reserve system 
was aimed at improving the land reserve system, strength-
ening land regulation, regulating land market operations, 
promoting land conservation and intensive use, and im-
proving the construction land support capacity. Land 
transfer revenue has become an important source for local 
governments to promote infrastructure construction and 
urban development. In addition, maximizing land revenue 
is a realistic goal for local governments. The special land 
systems have made local governments land speculation 
different from foreign speculation. Local governments’ 
land speculation constantly changes due to the evolution 
of land marketization and system. The low degree of land 
market transaction restriction indicates that government 
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intervention is less than expected, resulting in low hoard-
ing scale. In the same way, the higher the degree of fi-
nancial dependence on the land, the higher the hoardings 
scale by the government. Studies have shown that land 
revenue is important for local governments. As a result, 
local governments become incentives for land speculation 
for maximum benefits. However, this inference still lacks 
the support of empirical research.
2. Research hypotheses and empirical model
2.1. Research hypotheses
Land hoarding is a common phenomenon in the market 
economy and an important strategy for land speculation, 
which is affected by many factors. This study attempts 
to explore the land hoarding behavior of local govern-
ments and its influencing factors in the land marketi-
zation and urbanization in China. First, the theoretical 
model confirms that the impact of land price have always 
been considered a key variable. Thus, this study incorpo-
rates it in the model to examine the relationship between 
market price level and hoarding scale. Second, by paying 
attention to the impact of land marketization progress, 
the literature shows that the Land Bank System and land 
marketization are related to land hoarding. In the theo-
retical model, the degree of land marketization and in-
tervention is included. Third, land finance reflects local 
governments’ dependence on land revenue. The model 
incorporates local governments’ financial dependence 
into the model to study its impact. Certain institutional 
and economic development factors also have explanatory 
power (Liu et al., 2018c). Thus, the following assumptions 
are presented.
Hypothesis 1: Local governments’ land hoarding 
scale is positively affected by land prices.
High land prices indicate that land of the same area 
can receive more revenue, and local governments tend to 
hoard more land until the land market is booming and 
prices are high.
Hypothesis 2: Local governments’ land hoarding 
scale has a negative correlation with the degree of gov-
ernment intervention.
The higher the degree of government intervention, the 
higher the proportion of agreement transfer and the less 
the local governments’ hoardings scale.
Hypothesis 3: Local governments’ land hoarding 
scale is positively affected by land marketization and 
government land financial dependence.
The degree of land marketization reflects the use of 
bidding or agreement price to sell land in land transfer. 
When the ratio of agreement is low, the degree of mar-
ketization is high. When local governments obtain a high 
amount from the land market, they tend to hoard more. 
Dependence on land revenue will also affect the govern-
ment’s behavior. When the land revenue proportion of 
local finance is high, local governments tend to hoard 
more land.
2.2. Empirical model
Land prices and land hoarding scale are key factors. How-
ever, a strong endogeneity problem is found. The ordinary 
least squares (OLS) method leads to estimation coefficient 
bias. First, a mutual influence may exist between land 
hoarding scale and land price level. Hoarding scale affects 
land price level, whereas land price level, in turn, affects 
hoarding scale. Second, the actual land transaction price 
leads to measurement errors, which are not well reflected. 
Third, the model uses the average residential land price 
level, and the measurement method is affected by the het-
erogeneity of different regions, uses, and locations, and 
certain biases also exist. To solve endogeneity problems, 
instrumental variables must be available. Under the cur-
rent land system, the scale of urban exploitable land is 
approved by the central government through the quota 
indicator system of land use planning. The cultivated land 
is strictly protected and cannot be converted or developed. 
The amount of cultivated land is regarded as the exploit-
able land endowment indicator. We consider that the land 
price level is affected, and the amount of cultivated land 
does not affect the land scale. Wen and Goodman (2013) 
showed that per capita arable land area is negatively cor-
related with land prices and the amount of cultivated land 
in each area can be used as a instrumental variable. Sec-
ond, lag economic variable can be used as a instrumental 
variable to solve the unpredictable price problem (Murray, 
2006). This study takes the two-stage lag of land price level 
as another instrumental variable. To solve the measure-
ment error, the hysteresis level of endogenous variables is 
usually used as a instrumental variable. Therefore, three 
instrumental variables are constructed in the model, 
namely, the ratio of cultivated land, first phase of land 
prices lag, and second phase of lag.
To verify the three hypotheses, an empirical model is 
presented in Equation 1.
it o i it j it l it m it itLnLD a a LnLP a LnLM a LnLF a LnY= + + + + + ε .
 (1)
where: itLD  is a dependent variable that indicates the size 
of the residential land hoarded in the t-th period of area i.
Under the existing land management system, the resi-
dential land use plan (quota) is approved at the beginning 
of each year, indicating the residential land area that the 
government can use for transfer in the year. Local govern-
ments must sell land within this range and cannot break 
through the indicator. The local governments decide the 
actual transfer area according to the actual situation and 
can retain part of the land. This part forms the residential 
land that the government can hold and sell at any time. 
This research uses the difference between the approved 
residential land area and actual transfer scale in the cur-
rent year as the land hoarding area.
The quotas (zhibiao) are allocated to provincial gov-
ernments by central government (State Council) at the 
beginning of each year. So, the lawful quotas are the po-
tential and developable land in certain province. Local 
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ernments. At present, the prefecture-level cities’ data is 
not available. This study takes 31 provincial-level regions 
as research objects and collects the data of 31 provinces’ 
land and real estate markets from 2004 to 2015 for analy-
sis. The gross domestic product (GDP), per capita gross 
domestic product (PCGDP), local fiscal revenue, urban 
fixed asset investment, added value of the secondary and 
tertiary industries, and added value of urban employ-
ment in 31 provincial-level regions are derived from the 
China Statistical Yearbook (2005–2016). Provincial land 
allocation, agreement, bidding, auction, listing, transfer 
area, approval of residential land area, and transaction 
price are derived from the China Land and Resources 
Statistical Yearbook (2005–2016). The average land price 
and per capita GDP unit are yuan, the land area unit is 
hectare, and the local fiscal revenue and transaction price 
unit is 10,000 yuan.
3.2. Variable description
The dependent variable is the area of residential land hoard-
ing, which is equal to the difference between the amount of 
potential and actual residential land development. The an-
nual approval of the residential land area by the State Coun-
cil is regarded as the scale of the government’s potential land 
development. The transfer and allocation of residential land 
area is regarded as the amount of the actual government 
residential land development. The local governments’ fiscal 
behaviors and economic indicators can affect land scale and 
price (Zhang et al., 2016). In addition to residential land 
premium variable, we rely on government land finance, 
government intervention in the land market. These factors 
are analyzed to measure land market environment. The four 
variables in the model that have an impact on the size of 
land hoarding are considered exogenous variables and in-
clude three instrumental variables. The definition method 
and expected symbol of each variable are shown in Table 1.
Endogenous variables: land hoarding scale and land 
price level.
1. Land hoarding scale. The scale of residential land 
hoarded by the local governments is in hectares. The State-
owned land for the construction of residential land supply 
situation in Statistical Yearbook of Land and Resources is 
used as an index of residential land approved by the lo-
cal governments, and the land that developers purchase is 
regarded as the actual development of residential land. The 
two are subtracted to get the scale of local governments 
land hoarding that year. After the establishment of the land 
reserve system, the land transfer rights of local governments 
are relatively independent. Land accumulation scale can re-
flect the attitude of local governments in promoting land 
and determining whether land speculation exists.
2. Land price level. Local governments sell residential 
land through bid invitation, auction, and listing. Transac-
tion price is divided by the purchase of the land area to 
obtain the floor price in the provinces of the average price 
level of the year. The unit is yuan per square. The case of 
residential land can be reflected by the land and real-estate 
developments of enterprises to purchase.
governments cannot break through quotas, even if the 
land price is high profit. But the local governments have 
the right to hoard land, if they think it is not proper tim-
ing of selling land. So, the difference between approved 
quotas and actual selling can reflect the local governments’ 
preference. Just as Du and Periser’s (2014) opinions, this 
measurement of land speculation is approximate and not 
perfect. First, the approved quotas of land include rural 
and urban area, so the land hoarding area is overestimat-
ed for urban residential land. Besides, local governments’ 
preference, the quantity of land sales can be affected by 
other factors. For example, it is long time for land acquisi-
tion and infrastructure construction. Before the necessary 
infrastructure projects are finished, the land cannot be put 
on the market.
itLP  is an independent variable indicating the price 
level of residential land in the t-th period of area i. This 
study employs the price level of land sales in the region 
to measure its impact on land hoarding. Considering that 
the nature of the land to be sold greatly differs from the 
land price level, distinguishing the nature of the land to be 
transferred is necessary. Residential land is a land prop-
erty with high income return, and residential land price 
drastically fluctuates. Therefore, this research measures the 
land price level of the area on the basis of the price level 
of residential land. Furthermore, the relationship between 
the residential land hoarding scale and land price level is 
examined.
itLM  is an independent variable, indicating the de-
gree of land marketization and government intervention 
in the t-th period of region i. The model introduces two 
variables to verify its impact. First, considering that agree-
ment transfer is more affected by government factors than 
other modes of transfer, the extent of local governments’ 
direct intervention to the land transfer is measured by the 
transfer area of the total land area as an indicator. Second, 
the area allocated by the government to the transfer scale 
reflects the relative degree of liberalization of the regional 
land market. A high indicator value indicates a low degree 
of land marketization in the region.
itLF  is an independent variable that indicates the land 
financial dependency of region i in the t-th period. By 
measuring the proportion of local fiscal revenues occupied 
by land transfer revenues in this region, the higher the ra-
tio, the higher the local governments’ dependence on land 
revenue. The impact of land hoarding area is examined by 
the local government’s financial dependence.
itY  is the independent variable, and t is the area of so-
cial and economic factors affecting the size of land hoard-
ing, controlling its impact on land hoarding scale. α refers 
to the regression coefficient, and εit is the error term.
3. Research area and variable description
3.1. Research area
The State Council issued quotas for housing construc-
tion land to provincial governments, and then provincial 
governments decomposed the quotas to municipal gov-
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Exogenous variables: land marketization, land finan-
cial dependence, and social and economic variables.
3. Land marketization. Agreement transfer refers to 
the behavior of the land administration department on 
behalf of municipal governments and land users. It de-
termines the land prices on the basis of the announced 
land market value and transfers land use rights to land 
users. The degree of land marketization of local govern-
ments is measured by the ratio of the agreed area of  the 
state-owned construction land to the total land area. The 
higher the ratio is, the lower the degree of land marketi-
zation is. Land market environment can have an impact 
on local governments’ land hoarding behavior. If the land 
market environment is relatively loose, then the local gov-
ernments’ land transfer behavior can be affected by vari-
ables, such as land price.
4. Government intervention. In the Chinese land sys-
tem, land supply mode is a powerful tool for land market 
intervention. Land benefits greatly contribute to the financ-
ing of local income and infrastructure (Tian & Ma, 2008). 
According to the China National Land Resources Statistical 
Yearbook, the supply of state-owned construction land by 
local governments is mainly acquired through allocation, 
transfer, lease, and other land supply methods. Allocated 
land is the state-owned land use right obtained without 
compensation after the government approves the law. This 
Table 1. Variable measurement and expected impact
Variable Meaning Unit Expected symbol








The administrative allocation/transfer of land area reflects the direct 
intervention of local governments in land transfer.
% –
Land marketization The amount of land sold by the agreement/transfer of land area 
reflects the degree of marketization of land allocation in the economy.
% –
Land finance The annual land revenue/local government’s annual total fiscal revenue 
reflects the local government’s dependence on land revenue.
% +
Second and third 
industry added value
The annual added value of the second and third industries is used to 
determine the speed of urban economic growth.
billion +
Per capita GDP Per capita GDP yuan +
Fixed asset investment Urban fixed asset investment billion +
Employment growth Urban employment increased compared with that of the previous year 10,000 people +
Instrumental variables
Lag1 Land price Lagging the land price of the first phase Yuan per 
square meter
+
Lag2 Land price Lagging the land price of the second phase Yuan per 
square meter
+
Agricultural land area 
ratio
Proportion of cultivated land area in the provinces under the 
jurisdiction of the total area of  urban and rural construction land
% –
Note: Data sources: China Statistical Yearbook of Land and Resources (2007–2016) and China Statistical Yearbook (2007–2016). All the data is obtained 
from open resources, and the copyright is permitted legally.
indicator can reflect the government’s intervention in the 
land market to a certain extent. Availability of state-owned 
construction land allocated in the year to sell the distribu-
tion area is divided by the total area of the year to deter-
mine the extent of government intervention, in units of %. 
Studies have found that government regulation restrictions 
affect house and land prices (Ihlanfeldt, 2006). The higher 
the proportion of land allocated to the total transfer scale, 
the higher the government land market intervention and 
the smaller the land scale that can be auctioned.
5. Land finance. According to the Statistical Yearbook 
of Land and Resources, land can be sold for land revenue. 
This research investigates the dependence of local govern-
ments on land finance in the ratio of land fiscal revenue 
to the local fiscal revenue in the current year, in units of 
%. The higher the indicator, the higher the dependence of 
local governments on land finances. Descriptive statistics 
reveal that land revenue is a major source of local govern-
ments’ revenue. Thus, a large extent of financial depend-
ence may affect local governments’ land acts, incorporat-
ing factors to consider.
6. Added value of secondary and tertiary industries. 
According to the China Statistical Yearbook, the annual 
output value of the two industries of industry and service 
industry can be obtained. The added value of the output 
value of the two years is the increment of the second and 
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third industries, and the unit is 100 million yuan. The 
added value of the second and third industries can reflect 
the economic vitality of the current year. Therefore, the 
regional economic level can indirectly reflect the enthusi-
asm of developers to purchase land and the motive of the 
government to hoard land (Deng et al., 2006).
7. Per capita GDP. The China Statistical Yearbook can 
obtain the annual per capita GDP level of each province. 
Per capita GDP is an effective tool for grasping the state’s 
macroeconomic performance. This variable is also often 
used as an indicator of economic development in develop-
ment economics. The higher the per capita GDP level, the 
higher the level of economic development and the pur-
chasing power of residents. Therefore, this indicator can 
affect the behavior of government land transfer.
8. Urban fixed asset investment. The annual amount 
of newly added urban fixed asset investment in each prov-
ince can be obtained from the China Statistical Yearbook, 
with a unit of 100 million yuan. The amount of investment 
in fixed assets can show the level of economic develop-
ment in that year. The variables include the enterprises 
for capital construction, renovation, overhaul, and other 
fixed asset investment. The values show a certain period of 
construction and purchase of fixed assets, and businesses 
in this effort have cost changes off. These indicators should 
be included in the model to reflect the economic level.
9. Employment growth. Employment population of 
each province can be annually obtained from the China 
Statistical Yearbook. The employment population of the 
current year is subtracted from that of the previous year 
as the increase amount, with a unit of 10,000 people. The 
increase in the employment population can reflect the an-
nual economic development of each region. The higher 
the employment growth is, the higher the economy or the 
larger the population inflows. This relationship stimulates 
the local governments to use the land for sale.
10. Proportion of cultivated land. Apart from pre-
serving farmland, farmland protection policy has played 
a role in urban growth management (Zhong et al., 2018). 
The area of  cultivated land and that of urban and rural 
construction land in each province can be obtained each 
year. The ratio is used to measure the cultivated land, and 
the unit is %. The amount of cultivated land is strictly 
protected, and therefore accounted arable land affects the 
amount of land supply but does not affect the size of land 
hoarding. Thus, the proportion of arable land is included 
in the model as an instrumental variable for consideration.
4. Empirical result
4.1. Endogenous test and instrumental variable 
selection
The price of residential use in Formula (1) is an explana-
tory variable, and the literature suggests that endogenous 
testing is required. The McKinnon endogenous test re-
veals that the p value is 0.0062. Under the 1% significance 
level, the null hypothesis is rejected. Therefore, the model 
memory endogenous problem must be processed by in-
strumental variables. To adopt an appropriate estimation 
method, the error structure of the model must be tested. 
The results in Table 2 confirm that the Wald test results 
strongly reject the null hypothesis of the same variance. 
Inter-group heteroscedasticity is also considered.
Table 2. Wald heteroscedasticity test
Wald test Fixed effects model Feasible generalized least squares
Chi 924.30 3910.16
P. value 0.0000 0.0000
The model has three instrumental variables: (1) the 
proportion of cultivated land area in each province to the 
total area of urban and rural construction land and (2) the 
first- and second-order lag terms of land price. Instrumen-
tal variables may have weak correlations and endogeneity 
problems that require instrument variables to be detected. 
We have verified that the instrumental variable is qualified 
by a weak instrumental variable test. Table 3 shows that 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, and a strong cor-
relation exists between the instrumental and endogenous 
variables of residential land price.
Table 3. Weak instrumental variables test
Cragg–Donald Wald F 
statistic: 4.393
Stock–Yogo weak ID test 
critical value
10% maximal IV size 19.93
15% maximal IV size 11.59
20% maximal IV size 8.75
25% maximal IV size 7.25
Through the over-identification test, the p value in the 
result is greater than 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10. Therefore, the 
original hypothesis cannot be rejected. That is, the instru-
mental variables satisfy the exogenous hypothesis and can 
be applied to the model. In summary, the instrumental 
variables selected in this study are valid. So, 2SLS is effec-
tive under the predetermined spherical perturbation term. 
But if there is heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation, the 
GMM estimate is more efficient.
4.2. Results and analysis
4.2.1. Impact of land price on local governments’ land 
speculation
OLS, fixed effects, and dynamic GMM estimates are si-
multaneously performed on the data of 31 provinces. In-
strumental variables (IVs) are also used to estimate the 
model coefficients. Table 4 presents the estimated results. 
After many adjustments and models running, the current 
results are acceptable. In the models 1−4, the adjusted R2 
is not high, and the samples basing on provincial panel 
data which would affect adjusted R2 value. Positive results 
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between land price and residential land hoarding size can 
be observed, and coefficients in the model are significant. 
According to the estimation results, a one unit increase in 
the land price per square meter of residential land from 
2004 to 2015 increased the residential land hoarding scale 
by 0.59 hectares, whereas the least squares and fixed effects 
methods do not consider the endogeneity of the variables. 
Thus, the results are insignificant. After dealing with the 
endogenous problem of residential land price, the positive 
impact on the scale of local governments’ residential land 
hoarding becomes evident. The empirical results show that 
the increase in residential land price in the land market 
can affect the pace and behavior of local governments. 
When residential land price rises, local governments tend 
to hold more residential land, indicating that local govern-
ments may speculate in the land market.
Model 1 in Table  4 presents the estimation results 
when government intervention variables are the only 
factors included. The dynamic GMM estimation results 
reveal a significant positive correlation between local 
governments’ hoarding area and land price. A one unit 
increase in the price of the land results in the rise of lo-
cal governments’ land hoarding area by 0.29 hectares. By 
contrast, Model 2 and Model 3 reveal the estimation re-
sults when the degree of marketization and government 
land finance dependence are the only variables added. But, 
when the three variables are put in model 4, the result 
is insignificant. The limited sample data and addition of 
control variables that affect the significance of the model 
may be the reasons for insignificance.
4.2.2. Impact on land speculation of government 
intervention
To further observe the influence of exogenous factors, this 
study establishes a model to integrate government inter-
vention, land market environment, and land financial de-
pendence for dynamic GMM estimates. The new model is 
compared to OLS method and fixed effects model. Table 4 
provides the results.
Although the added partial explanatory variables are 
significant in the regression results of the least squares 
and fixed effects methods, the land price of the key ex-
planatory variables is insignificant, and neither of these 
methods considers land price endogeneity. By contrast, 
dynamic GMM estimates consider the land price endo-
geneity, and their conclusions are credible. Among them, 
government intervention has a negative impact on land 
hoarding (coefficient, –0.28), and the coefficient is signifi-
cant, thus supporting Hypothesis 2. The GMM estimation 
results presented in Model 2 and Model 3 in Table 4 reveal 
that in addition to the negative effects of land market en-
vironment, financial dependence and land hoarding, the 
line number is insignificant and cannot be used to explain 
land market and land finance dependence on the relation-
ship with government land hoarding.
Intervention in the land market is partly a reflection of 
the attitude of local governments. In terms of the degree 
of freedom of land allocation, administrative allocation is 
an effective means for local governments to intervene in 
land supply. When the government strengthens the inter-
vention in the land market and increases the proportion 
of allocated land, the land area available for transfer, de-
gree of marketization, and scale of the residential land are 
reduced. Therefore, land market is subject to government 
intervention influence, and the lower the allocated pro-
portion to the total area, the greater the residential land.
4.2.3. Regional differences in government land 
behavior
Geography matters in Chinese housing markets where 
land is discretely allocated by the government. Existing re-
search found that urban land expansion in China is highly 
uneven across regions, and the degree of land expansion 
in the western region is lower than that in the eastern re-
gion (Liu et al., 2018c). Significant regional differences af-
fect China’s land market development on illegal land use. 
Moreover, the impact of land market development in the 
eastern region on illegal land use is more pronounced 
than that in the central and western regions.
Based on the results estimated by sub-regional GMM, 
the correlation coefficient between the residential land va-
cancy scale and the residential land price in the eastern 
region is positive under the 10% significance level. There-
fore, the coefficient is significant. A one unit increase in 
residential land price in the eastern region can also in-
crease the residential land hoarding scale by 0.26 hectares, 
indicating that the residential land price in the eastern 
region significantly affects the residential land hoarding 
scale in the same region. Model 9−16 in Table 5 provides 
the estimation results, which confirm that the land prices 
and the local governments’ land hoarding in central and 
western regions have a positive correlation. However, the 
resulting coefficient is insignificant and cannot explain the 
existence of speculative land hoarding between land and 
local governments in the mid-west region.
The GMM results in different regions indicate the dif-
ference between land price and local governments’ land. In 
recent years, national urbanization has undergone rapid de-
velopment in the eastern region. High levels of economic 
development can make use of small land areas, resulting in 
high local governments’ financial dependence on land com-
pared with the mid-west region. The descriptive analysis of 
data has also confirmed this point. By contrast, the rela-
tionship between residential land price in the central and 
western regions and the size of residential land hoarding 
by local governments is insignificant. However, the basis for 
economic development, public facilities, and provided sup-
port are not enough. This area is mainly supported through 
government supply of pure public goods to meet infrastruc-
ture requirement. Therefore, a large gap exists between land 
value and the eastern region. A significant positive corre-
lation also exists between fixed asset investment and per 
capita GDP with local governments’ residential land hoard-
ing area. This relationship indicates that regional economic 
development level and investment activity affect local gov-
ernments’ land behavior and urban expansion.
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Conclusions
This study uses 31 provincial-level panel data from 2004 
to 2015 to establish a systematic GMM estimation model, 
which analyzes the impact of government intervention, 
land marketization level, and land price level on local gov-
ernments’ land hoarding scale and speculation behavior. 
The following results are obtained.
Hypothesis 1 is confirmed. Land price has a signifi-
cant positive impact on local governments’ land hoarding 
scale. When the local price of residential land is higher, 
local governments will accumulate more land. Specifically, 
the land price in the whole country has increased by one 
unit, and the land hoarding area of  local governments has 
increased by 0.585 hectares. The results also indicate that 
local governments speculate on land. GMM estimates of 
data across the country have revealed regional differences 
in land speculation. If the residential land price in the east-
ern region increases by one unit, then local governments’ 
residential land hoarding scale increases by 0.26 hectares, 
which is more evident than the land speculation in central 
and western regions. The policy system transfers land ap-
preciation to governments. However, the actual situation 
is more complicated than expected. Local governments’ 
land hoarding scale is staggering, indicating that local 
governments have become speculators in the land market.
Hypothesis 2 is also supported. Government interven-
tion can negatively affect the land hoarding scale. This 
research measures the extent to which governments in-
tervene in the land market using the land transfer other 
than administrative allocation. The more the adminis-
trative allocations, the greater the degree of government 
intervention and the smaller the land scale available for 
land market transfer. Therefore, land hoarding decreases. 
The empirical results show that the smaller the degree of 
government intervention, the smaller the scale of market 
transactions and the lesser the speculative behavior of the 
government. Moreover, sub-regional empirical results are 
confirmed.
Hypothesis 3 has not been confirmed. A certain rela-
tionship is found among variables that can be generated 
on the basis of descriptive statistics. In keeping with the 
policy background factors, the data used in this study are 
the comprehensive panel data acquired after fully imple-
menting the bidding and auction system. Given the lim-
ited data sample size, the degree of land marketization 
and governments’ land financial dependence have not 
produced significant results in the model. Therefore, fu-
ture studies must interpret this hypothesis through data 
updates and model corrections.
A strong endogeneity exists between local govern-
ments’ land hoarding area and land price. The traditional 
simple linear regression model cannot solve the endog-
enous problem and affect the model estimation results. 
GMM estimation method can effectively eliminate the 
endogenous problem between land area and land price by 
using instrumental variables, making the results stable and 
in line with expectations.
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